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Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of controlling one’s own actions, and
the experience of controlling external events with one’s actions. The present study
examined the effect of strength of intentional effort on SoA. We manipulated the strength
of intentional effort using three types of buttons that differed in the amount of force
required to depress them. We used a self-attribution task as an explicit measure of SoA.
The results indicate that strength of intentional effort enhanced self-attribution when
action-effect congruency was unreliable. We concluded that intentional effort importantly
affects the integration of multiple cues affecting explicit judgments of agency when the
causal relationship action and effect was unreliable.
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INTRODUCTION
When we intend and take actions, a subjective feeling that we have caused those actions and
their effects usually arises. Sense of agency (SoA) refers to this subjective feeling of controlling
one’s own actions and causing external events (Gallagher, 2000). SoA is a crucial element
of self-consciousness; many fields (e.g., psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and psychiatry)
have accordingly examined it. SoA’s underlying mechanisms remain controversial, however.
For example, the comparator model suggests that internal predictions of sensory feedback are
generated from an efference copy of a motor signal, and are compared with actual sensory
feedback: SoA arises if the copy and the feedback match, and is inhibited if they do not (Frith
et al., 2000). Recent studies, however, have suggested that SoA is determined not only by internal
forwarding mechanisms, but also by an integrative process involving both internal and external
cues. Internal cues are mental states (e.g., motor signals, priming, beliefs, knowledge, effort, and
reward expectation); in contrast, external cues are perceived information (e.g., effect, contextual
information, and actual reward). Cue integration theory thus proposes that SoA is generated from
the integration of multiple internal and external cues, whose weightings are determined by their
availability and reliability (Moore and Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2013).
In terms of the internal cues of cue integration theory, recent empirical studies have shown that
subliminal priming prior to an action influenced SoA (Chambon and Haggard, 2012; Sidarus et al.,
2013; Damen et al., 2014). However, among the internal cues influencing experience of SoA, effort
has received comparatively little attention. Thus, in the present study, we examined the effect of
strength of intentional effort on SoA.
Individuals are considered to expend effort when they cause actions using their bodies (Preston
and Wegner, 2009); the sensation of effort is considered to accompany the performance and
control of actions (Lafargue and Franck, 2009). One previous study investigated the effect of effort
on intentional binding, which is the implicit measure of SoA (Demanet et al., 2013). In their
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experiment, participants performed the intentional binding
task using a PC mouse with their right hand while pulling
a stretch band of varying resistance levels. However, the
manipulation of effort in this study was not related to actions
that caused external events. Hence, no study has yet examined
the effect of effort strength that is directly linked to external
events on the processes underlying SoA (we refer to this as
“intentional effort”). We consider that using actions to cause
external events is an important element of understanding
the roles of effort in SoA experiments. Indeed, according to
the “ideomotor theory,” what we intend to cause with our
actions influences how we move our body (Pfister et al., 2010,
2014a,b). Thus, in the SoA experimental paradigm, intentional
effort—which is directly linked to action effects—must be
introduced.
In previous research, two types of experimental tasks have
been used to examine SoA: subjective SoA judgment tasks and
intentional binding effect tasks. In tasks examining subjective
judgments of SoA, participants are instructed to make an explicit
judgment of self- or other-attribution. For example, participants
may report on whether they judged they had caused a certain
effect (Aarts et al., 2005; Kühn et al., 2011; Maeda et al.,
2012, 2013). Intentions, thoughts, and social and contextual
cues likely importantly affect such explicit judgments of agency
(Synofzik et al., 2008). In contrast, the intentional binding effect
is the temporal compression of the perceived interval between
voluntary actions and their sensory consequences (Haggard
et al., 2002; Haggard, 2005). In the original paradigm of the
intentional binding effect, participants were instructed to judge
the onsets of either their voluntary actions, or tones presented
250 ms after the actions. Compared to a baseline condition in
which participants’ actions did not cause tones or tones were
presented without actions, participants’ judged time of their
actions’ onset shifted toward the tones, and participants’ onset
judgments of tones shifted toward the actions. The intentional
binding effect is not equal to SoA (Ebert and Wegner, 2010),
but is considered to reflect implicit aspects of SoA (Moore et al.,
2012).
In this study, we used an agency attribution task to
determine how delayed effect and intentional effort—as external
and internal factors, respectively—as well as their interaction
influenced SoA emergence. We hypothesized that stronger
intentional effort (i.e., an internal cue) would promote SoA under
conditions wherein visual feedback (external cue) was unreliable.
This hypothesis was based on Moore and Fletcher’s (2012)
cue integration theory, which suggests that SoA emergence is
compensated via internal cues when external cues are unreliable
due to the temporal incongruence of action and feedback. We
used a simple action–feedback task modified from previous
studies, in which participants pushed a button to cause changes
in an object (Maeda et al., 2012, 2013), and manipulated the delay
before the change to create unreliable conditions. Further, we
manipulated effort strength using three types of button requiring
different pushing force. Pushing a button requiring more force
(a “harder” button), was considered to involve stronger effort
than pushing a button requiring less force (a “softer” button);
participants were informed of the types of button before trials.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-five students from the University of Tokyo participated
in the study (six female, mean age 22.7, SD = 1.71). The present
study was approved by the ethics committee at the Graduate
School of Engineering of the University of Tokyo; all participants
gave written informed consent before participating.
Intentional Effort Manipulation
The strength of intentional effort was manipulated with three
different buttons (OMRON VX-5-1A2, V-10-1A4, V-15-1A6)
requiring different amounts of pushing force. The three buttons
had the same appearance and stroke, and differed only in
the force required to depress them. The required amounts of
force were 0.10, 0.65, and 2.70 N for the soft, medium, and
hard buttons, respectively. The soft, medium, and hard buttons
were used in the weak, medium, and strong intentional effort
conditions, respectively.
Task
In the self–other attribution task (Figure 1), each trial began
with a 180 mm × 245 mm black screen, and with a 5 mm white
square, which appeared from the bottom of the screen and moved
upward at a speed of 20 mm/s. Participants were instructed
to push one of the three buttons (buttons were consistent in
each block and differed between blocks) as quickly as possible
with their dominant index finger when they saw the square’s
color change to yellow. After participants pushed the button, the
square jumped 25 mm upward at a random delay (100, 200, 300,
400, 500, 700, or 1000 ms). Participants were informed that the
computer would sometimes interrupt their commands, and cause
the box to jump after an arbitrary delay. After the square had
jumped, participants orally reported whether they felt they had
caused the square to jump upward as intended by giving “yes” or
“no” responses.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. After
receiving an explanation of the experimental tasks, participants
pushed each button 10 times to acquaint themselves with the
buttons’ hardness. The task used three blocks, and each block
used one of the three buttons. Before each block, participants
performed three practice trials with the appropriate button to
acquaint themselves with that button’s hardness. In each block,
participants performed 70 trials, comprising 10 trials for each
delay condition. Trial order was randomized in each block.
Block order (i.e., order of buttons) was counterbalanced between
participants. The experiment took 45 min on average.
RESULTS
The mean proportions of yes-responses (i.e., self-agency
responses) for each condition are shown in Figure 2. Self-
attribution decreased with increasing delay. We focused on the
delay conditions in which visual feedback was unreliable. For
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FIGURE 1 | A timeline of a trial. Each trial started with a 180 mm × 245 mm black screen, and with a 5-mm white square which appeared from the bottom of the
screen and moved upward at a speed of 20 mm/s. Participants were instructed to push a specified button as quickly as possible with their dominant index finger
when they saw the color of the square change to yellow. After pushing the button, the square jumped 25 mm upward at a random delay (100, 200, 300, 400, 500,
700, or 1000 ms).
FIGURE 2 | Mean proportions of self-responses in the self–other
attribution task. Error bars represent within-subject standard errors for each
delay condition, as computed according to Loftus and Masson’s (1994)
method. The self-agency response rate decreased with increasing delay, and
was greater in the strong intentional effort condition than in the weak and
medium intentional effort conditions when the delay of effect was 700 ms.
statistical analysis, we first checked the normality of the results,
and then conducted parametric tests on those results that were
well-modeled by the normal distribution, and non-parametric
tests for those that were not.
We used the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for each delay and
intentional effort condition to check the normality of the data.
The results in the 500 and 700 ms delay conditions in all the
intentional effort conditions were well-modeled by the normal
distribution (for the weak condition, d = 0.127 and 0.200; for the
medium condition, d= 0.177 and 0.199; for the strong condition,
d= 0.195 and 0.202, respectively, n.s.). However, the results from
other delay conditions (100, 200, 300, 400, and 1000 ms) were not
normally distributed.
Regarding the 500 and 700 ms delay conditions, we conducted
a 3 × 2 (intentional effort × delay) repeated-measures ANOVA
on participants’ responses; regarding other delay conditions,
we used Friedman’s test for further analysis. Regarding the
ANOVA, the main effect of delay was significant, but the main
effect of intentional effort was not [F(1,24) = 55.05, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.696; F(2,48) = 0.91, n.s., η2p = 0.036, respectively]. The
interaction between intentional effort and delay was significant
[F(2,48) = 9.00, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.273]. Post hoc testing
(Bonferroni corrected) of the interaction indicated that self-
attribution was significantly elevated in the strong intentional
effort condition compared to the weak and medium intentional
effort conditions when the delay was 700 ms (p < 0.01; p < 0.05,
respectively), but did not differ between intentional effort
conditions in the 500 ms delay condition. Regarding Friedman’s
test, in all delay conditions whose results were not normally
distributed, participants’ responses did not differ significantly
between the intentional effort conditions (100 ms: χ2(2)= 3.714,
n.s.; 200 ms: χ2(2) = 6.000, n.s.; 300 ms: χ2(2) = 2.480, n.s.;
400 ms: χ2(2)= 0.237, n.s.; 1000 ms: χ2(2)= 3.561, all n.s.).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we investigated the effect of intentional
effort on self-agency judgment. The self-attribution task was
an explicit measure of SoA. We manipulated the strength of
intentional effort using three types of button requiring different
amounts of pushing force. Intentional effort was considered
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stronger when participants pushed the hard button compared
to the medium and soft buttons. We hypothesized that stronger
intentional effort would promote SoA in the condition in
which visual feedback was unreliable. With a simple action-
feedback task, we found a significant effect of intentional
effort when feedback was delayed by 700 ms and the ratio
of self-agency dropped to 30–40%. These results indicate that
self-attribution was significantly increased by increased effort
strength only when the reliability of action feedback was
very low.
Previous research has reported that judgments of self-
attribution are inhibited by long temporal delays of actions’
consequences (Sato and Yasuda, 2005; Ebert and Wegner, 2010;
Kühn et al., 2011; Maeda et al., 2012, 2013; Farrer et al., 2013; Hon
et al., 2013; Kawabe, 2013; Wen et al., 2015). In other words, when
an action’s consequence follows a considerable delay, people tend
to attribute the consequence to others, rather than themselves.
Our results replicated this finding. The proportion of self-agency
responses decreased to around 10% across all types of button
when the delay was 1000 ms; however, this tendency was affected
by strength of intentional effort in the 700 ms delay condition.
Specifically, when participants pushed the hard button, their
self-agency responses decreased less compared to in conditions
where they pushed softer buttons with about 700 ms delay.
The 700 ms delay condition was the only condition in which
self-agency responses were affected by intentional effort. It is
possible that when the visual feedback delay became sufficiently
long that self-agency responses decreased to around 30–40%,
visual feedback became most unreliable and responses were
most strongly affected by the strength of intentional effort. In
this condition of uncertain causality, judgment of agency may
be more easily affected by other factors, such as intentional
effort, thoughts, and social and contextual cues. In the present
study, participants who pushed the hard button likely had
stronger intentional effort than participants who pushed the
medium or soft buttons; this stronger intentional effort may have
contributed to participants’ self-attribution judgment, explaining
the more frequent self-agency responses. This would suggest
that when the causal relationship between actions and effects
was less unreliable (i.e., when the delay was shorter or longer
than 700 ms), intentional effort did not affect judgment of
agency. Although this difference may seem subtle, we believe
that it may be critical in the SoA experience, given that it
emerges at a millisecond-level time window. However, because
the limited number of possible trials, we did not test delays
between 500 and 700 ms. Therefore, it was not possible to
determine the exact point of reliability at which intentional
effort’s effect began to appear. Future research should identify this
point.
Our results were consistent with the cue integration theory
of SoA (Moore and Fletcher, 2012), which was proposed to
account for SoA’s emergence. That article suggested that SoA
depends on both internal and external cues, and that the
integration of these cues are affected by each cue’s reliability.
When a predicted effect occurs immediately after an action,
or in contrast, obviously delayed from an action, motor
signals, and the following effects are considered to have more
weight than other cues in the judgment of agency (Moore
and Fletcher, 2012); however, when the causal relationship
between actions and effects becomes unreliable, other cues
besides motor signals and predictions may have a greater
effect. In the present study, we manipulated an internal cue—
strength of intentional effort—and found that it significantly
affected judgment of self-attribution only when the causal
relationship between action and effect became as unreliable as
the condition in which self-agency responses decreased to around
30–40%.
Although the sensation of effort has been considered to
accompany action and action control, no research had examined
the effect of intentional effort on SoA. Prior study demonstrated
the effect of effort not related to the event-causing action
(Demanet et al., 2013). Our results provide the first evidence
that strength of intentional effort affects the explicit aspects of
SoA. In the present study, however, tactile feedback in the hard
button condition was stronger than in the medium and soft
conditions, in addition to stronger intentional effort. This may
also affect judgments of agency, and should be examined in future
research. Moreover, although we manipulated an internal cue in
this study, it is possible that the intentional effort had an effect
on other internal cues, such as motor signals and prediction
of feedback; as such, this point should be examined in future
studies.
Our results are also important regarding engineering. The
feeling of control is indispensable to people manipulating a
human–machine interface; this feeling is precisely SoA. A good
feeling of SoA is particularly important in operating remote–
control interfaces; however, operating delay is often inevitable in
this setting. Our results indicate that operating effort may assist
operators who experience such delays.
CONCLUSION
We demonstrated that strong intentional effort promotes
judgments of self-attribution when the causal relationship
between actions and effects is uncertain. Intentional effort
strength’s effect is likely greater when action-effect congruency
is unreliable. This study may contribute to the understanding
of the underlying mechanisms of SoA. Further, we recommend
that future studies examine intentional effort’s effect on SoA in
psychopathological conditions such as schizophrenia.
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